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Abstract
This note provides additional interpretation for the counterfactual outcome dis-
tribution and corresponding unconditional quantile “effects” defined and estimated
by Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009) and Chernozhukov, Ferna´ndez-Val, and Melly
(2013). With conditional independence of the policy variable of interest, these methods
estimate the policy effect for certain types of policies, but not others. In particular, they
estimate the effect of a policy change that itself satisfies conditional independence.
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1 Introduction
Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009) and Chernozhukov, Ferna´ndez-Val, and Melly (2013), among
others, consider a counterfactual distribution of an outcome variable (scalar Y ) constructed
by replacing the marginal distribution of covariates (vector X) with a new distribution (CDF
GX(·)) while maintaining the same conditional distribution (conditional CDF FY |X(·)). Us-
ing the notation from equations (1) and (2) of Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009), the actual
and counterfactual distributions are, respectively,
actual: FY (y) =
∫
FY |X(y | X = x) dFX(x), (1)
counterfactual: G∗Y (y) =
∫
FY |X(y | X = x) dGX(x). (2)
Both papers use the phrase “unconditional quantile regression” to mean the change in the
quantiles of the unconditional distribution of Y associated with a change in the distribution
of X. Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009) consider an infinitessimal change in the direction
of GX, starting at the actual FX. Chernozhukov, Ferna´ndez-Val, and Melly (2013) consider
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the full change to GX, and thus the difference between quantiles of the distributions in (1)
and (2); see their discussion on page 2213 (including footnote 8). Chernozhukov, Ferna´ndez-Val, and Melly
(2013, §2.2) call the difference between quantiles of the distributions in (1) and (2) a “type
2 counterfactual effect,” but they do not mean “effect” in the causal sense, clarifying, “It is
important to note that these effects do not necessarily have a causal interpretation without
additional conditions” (p. 2210, §2.1).
For description, these methods provide a useful addition to the vast decomposition lit-
erature in economics. For example, consider the wage difference between male and female
workers. This can be decomposed into two components: the difference in observable charac-
teristics, and the difference in wage distributions conditional on observables. If (1) represents
the actual female wage distribution, then (2) represents the counterfactual wage distribution
from changing the observable characteristics to the male distribution, but holding constant
the female conditional wage distributions.
For policy effects, however, generally (2) is not a good guess of the outcome of a policy
that changes the distribution of X from FX to GX. In certain settings, it may be plausible
that FY |X is policy-invariant, but usually it is not, due to the usual sources of endogeneity
like selection. For example, if individuals sort into low and high education (X) based on
unobserved ability that affects wages (Y ), then a policy increasing education would move
low-ability individuals into the high-education group, affecting the distribution of wages for
that group, i.e., affecting FY |X.
Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009) and Chernozhukov, Ferna´ndez-Val, and Melly (2013)
both mention that (2) is useful for policy analysis given policy-invariant FY |X.
1 Chernozhukov, Ferna´ndez-Val, and Melly
(2013) write, “changing the covariate distribution. . . has a causal interpretation as the policy
effect. . . under the assumption that the policy does not affect the conditional distribution”
(p. 2215, §2.3). Similarly, Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009) say this interpretation holds
“under the assumption that the conditional distribution FY |X(·) is unaffected by this small
manipulation of the distribution of X” (p. 955, §2.1). That is, these approaches take FY |X to
be “structural” in the sense of “invariant to a class of modifications” (Heckman and Vytlacil,
2007, p. 4848), even though it is not explicitly estimated by Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux
(2009).
My contribution is to characterize which policies indeed do not affect the conditional dis-
tribution, given a conditional independence assumption.2 This is true if the changes in policy
1Additionally, in their Section 2.3 (“When Counterfactual Effects Have a Causal Interpretation”),
Chernozhukov, Ferna´ndez-Val, and Melly (2013) consider implications of the same conditional independence
assumption I consider below (their (2.8)), but only for “type 1 counterfactual effects” where the conditional
distribution changes but the covariate distribution remains fixed (Lemma 2.1), not for unconditional quantile
regression.
2The need to define a particular class of policies is not specific to unconditional quantile regression;
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variable(s) also satisfy conditional independence. I formulate this first with a binary policy
variable, where the variable and its changes are both conditionally independent of the poten-
tial outcomes given a vector of controls. Then I formulate the result in terms of a nonpara-
metric, nonseparable structural model with a vector of continuous and/or discrete policy vari-
ables, which (along with their changes) are conditionally independent of the unobservables
given a vector of controls. For such conditionally independent policy changes, the methods
of Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009) and Chernozhukov, Ferna´ndez-Val, and Melly (2013)
can estimate policy effects, whereas for other policies, the methods generally do not estimate
policy effects.
My results complement the identification results of Rothe (2012). He considers the effect
on the unconditional Y distribution of a policy that changes the unconditional distribution
of one particular variable of interest. Assuming conditional independence of the policy vari-
able and unobservables (given a vector of controls), and assuming the policy changes the
unconditional distribution of the policy variable in a deterministic way that maintains rank
invariance, the distributional effect is point identified for a continuous policy variable and set
identified for a discrete variable. Instead, in Section 3, I allow the policy to affect a vector
of variables, replacing the deterministic rank-invariant policy change with a conditionally
independent policy change, which achieves point identification even for discrete policy vari-
ables. I also allow stochastic policy changes. I further connect our results by showing that
the policy change in Rothe (2012) satisfies conditional independence when the policy vari-
able is continuous but not discrete. With a discrete policy variable, my results show point
identification is recovered by strengthening conditional independence of the observed policy
variable to conditional independence of Rothe’s (2012) underlying rank variable.
Section 2 has results in a potential outcomes framework. Section 3 has results for a
general structural model with multiple discrete and/or continuous policy variables.
2 Potential outcomes model
I use the following notation and definitions. Let vector X be partitioned into X = (X1,X2),
where X1 ∈ {0, 1} is the binary treatment variable of policy interest and vector X2 ∈
X2 contains control variables. Potential untreated and treated outcomes are Y0 and Y1,
respectively. The observed outcome is
Y = Y0(1−X1) + Y1X1. (3)
e.g., Heckman and Vytlacil (2007, p. 4848) write generally, “A system structural for one class of policy
modifications may not be structural for another.”
3
Here, “conditional independence” means
(Y0, Y1) ⊥ X1 | X2, (4)
i.e., conditional on the control variables in X2, there is independence between the treat-
ment X1 and the potential outcome pair (Y0, Y1). This condition has many other names
(conditional exogeneity, unconfoundedness, strong ignorability, etc.).
Assumption A1. Outcome Y is generated depending on potential outcomes as in (3), and
conditional independence holds in the sense of (4).
Assumption A2. The policy changes (X1,X2) to (X1 + ∆1,X2), where ∆1 is a random
variable satisfying the conditional independence assumption
(Y0, Y1) ⊥ ∆1 | X2. (5)
The policy change ∆1 may depend on X1, X2, unobservables, and/or randomization, as
long as (5) is satisfied. For example, ∆1 = 1 − X1 switches all X1 = 0 to X1 = 1 and
vice-versa, and it satisfies (5) since ∆1 only depends on X1 and X1 satisfies conditional
independence. Similarly, (5) is satisfied by setting all X1 = 0 with ∆1 = −X1, or setting
all X1 = 1 with ∆1 = 1 − X1. Randomization like P(∆1 = 0) = P(∆1 = 1 − X1) = 1/2
also satisfies (5) as long as the randomization mechanism is conditionally independent of the
potential outcomes. The policy could even depend on X2, like setting ∆1 = 0 for certain
ranges of X2, as long as (5) holds. The policy could affect X1 indirectly, like by changing
incentives to participate as in Heckman and Vytlacil (2001), unless the incentives affect
individuals differently depending on their potential outcomes (as is often true), thus violating
(5). Other than the restriction of changing only X1 (and not X2), the main restriction is
that the policy may not (explicitly or implicitly) target individuals based on their potential
outcomes.
Theorem 1. Given Assumption A1, a policy satisfying Assumption A2 does not change the
conditional distribution FY |X.
Proof. Given A1, the actual conditional distribution can be simplified using (3) and (4).
Evaluating the conditional CDF at value y conditional on X1 = x1 and X2 = x2,
FY |X(y | x1,x2) ≡ P(Y ≤ y | X1 = x1,X2 = x2)
= P(
by (3)︷︸︸︷
Yx1 ≤ y | X1 = x1,X2 = x2)
= P(Yx1 ≤ y |
by (4)︷ ︸︸ ︷
X2 = x2). (6)
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Under the new policy, the first element of X becomes X1 +∆1, so
FY |X(y | x1,x2) ≡ P(Y ≤ y | X1 +∆1 = x1,X2 = x2)
= P(
by (3)︷︸︸︷
Yx1 ≤ y | X1 +∆1 = x1,X2 = x2)
= P(Yx1 ≤ y |
by (4) and (5)︷ ︸︸ ︷
X2 = x2 ). (7)
That is, after conditioning on X2 = x2, further conditioning on X1 + ∆1 has no effect on
the distribution of Yx1, since both X1 and ∆1 are conditionally independent of potential
outcomes. Thus, FY |X remains unchanged.
Theorem 1 readily extends to multi-valued treatment, i.e., when the support of X1 is
{0, 1, . . . , J} instead of just {0, 1}.
Theorem 1 could be applied to the empirical example from Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux
(2009, §4). There, Y is log wage (for U.S. males); X1 is a dummy for union membership; and
X2 includes dummies for non-white, married, education categories, and ranges of experience.
Footnote 18 (p. 962) says, “For simplicity, we maintain the assumption that union coverage
status is exogenous. Studies that have used selection models or longitudinal methods [to treat
endogeneity] suggest that the exogeneity assumption only introduces small biases.” That is,
they suggest Assumption A1 is at least a good approximation. However, Assumption A2
must also hold to interpret the UQR estimates as policy effects.
In their setting, Assumption A2 would arguably hold for some policies but not others.
It holds for the extreme case of outlawing unionization, but possibly not for marginal policy
changes that operate by changing incentives or information sets. For example, if a policy
popularizes empirical results that union membership benefits lower-skilled workers more
than higher-skilled workers, consequent changes in union membership would likely depend
on potential outcomes (via unobserved skill) even conditional on X2. It is difficult to guess
whether a right-to-work law would (approximately) satisfy Assumption A2. If the law deters
workers from union membership independently of their potential outcomes conditional on
their X2, then Assumption A2 would hold. However, if low-wage workers are deterred more
than high-wage workers by union membership becoming relatively more costly than non-
membership, then Assumption A2 may not hold.
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3 Structural model with general policy variable
The intuition of Theorem 1 applies to a general structural model with a general vector X1
affected by the policy. ThisX1 can have continuous, discrete, and/or categorical components.
The structural model is
Y = h(X1,X2,U), (8)
where Y is the scalar outcome, X1 is now allowed to be a vector affected by the policy, X2
is a vector of control variables, and U is a vector of unobserved determinants of Y . The
structural function h(·) is unknown and unrestricted (i.e., nonparametric and nonseparable)
but assumed invariant to the policy considered.
The conditional independence assumption is
U ⊥ X1 | X2, (9)
i.e., conditional on the control variables in X2, there is independence between X1 and U.
Assumption A3. Given the policy-invariant structural model in (8), conditional indepen-
dence holds in the sense of (9).
Assumption A4. The policy changes (X1,X2) to (X1 +∆1,X2), where ∆1 is a random
vector satisfying the conditional independence assumption
U ⊥ ∆1 | X2. (10)
Theorem 2. Given Assumption A3, a policy satisfying Assumption A4 does not change the
conditional distribution FY |X.
Proof. Given A3, the actual (initial) conditional distribution FY |X simplifies to
FY |X(y | x1,x2) ≡ P(Y ≤ y | X1 = x1,X2 = x2)
= P(
by (8)︷ ︸︸ ︷
h(X1,X2,U) ≤ y | X1 = x1,X2 = x2)
= P(h(x1,x2,U) ≤ y | X1 = x1,X2 = x2)
= P(h(x1,x2,U) ≤ y |
by (9)︷ ︸︸ ︷
X2 = x2). (11)
Under the new policy, the first elements of X change from X1 to X1 +∆1, so
FY |X(y | x1,x2) ≡ P(Y ≤ y | X1 +∆1 = x1,X2 = x2)
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= P(
by (8) and A4︷ ︸︸ ︷
h(X1 +∆1,X2,U) ≤ y | X1 +∆1 = x1,X2 = x2)
= P(h(x1,x2,U) ≤ y | X1 +∆1 = x1,X2 = x2)
= P(h(x1,x2,U) ≤ y |
by (9) and (10)︷ ︸︸ ︷
X2 = x2 ). (12)
That is, after conditioning on X2 = x2, further conditioning on X1 +∆1 has no effect on
the distribution of U and thus no effect on the distribution of h(x1,x2,U) (given values x1
and x2), since both X1 and ∆1 are conditionally independent of the unobserved U. Thus,
FY |X remains unchanged.
As noted in the introduction, Rothe (2012) considers a related setting; details follow.
Assumption A3 is the same, but Assumption A4 differs. Rothe (2012) has scalar X1 that
is (without loss of generality) written in terms of a latent rank variable W ∼ Unif(0, 1) as
X1 = F
−1
1 (W ), where F
−1
1 (·) is the generalized inverse of CDF F1(·). The policy then changes
X1 from F
−1
1 (W ) to F
−1
p (W ), where F
−1
p (·) is the generalized inverse of CDF Fp(·), the
counterfactual CDF of X1. This imposes rank invariance because w ≥ w
′ ⇐⇒ F−11 (w) ≥
F−11 (w
′) ⇐⇒ F−1p (w) ≥ F
−1
p (w
′), and it is deterministic in the sense that Fp(·) is non-
random. If X1 is continuous, then W = F1(X1) and
∆1 = F
−1
p (W )−X1 = F
−1
p (F1(X1))−X1. (13)
This satisfies Assumption A4, suggesting the policy effect is point identified, and indeed
Rothe (2012) provides point identification (by a different argument).
However, with discrete X1, (13) fails. With discrete X1, W 6= F1(X1) because W ∼
Unif(0, 1) but F1(X1) has a discrete distribution. Consequently, ∆1 cannot be written solely
in terms ofX1 because F
−1
p (W ) 6= F
−1
p (F1(X1)); instead, ∆1 = F
−1
p (W )−X1 also depends on
W . With the additional assumption of conditional independence of W , point identification
would result. However, W may violate conditional independence even if X1 satisfies it.
Thus, generally, policy effects are only partially identified with discrete X1, and Rothe (2012)
derives the identified sets.
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